[vox] Security problems with URL handling in Opera and KDE (forward from KDE-announce list)
Henry House
vox@lists.lugod.org
Mon, 17 May 2004 10:42:26 -0700
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I am passing along this security advosiry since I know that lots of LUGODers
use KDE and/or Opera.
----- Forwarded message from Waldo Bastian <bastian@kde.org> -----
=46rom: Waldo Bastian <bastian@kde.org>
To: kde-announce@kde.org, bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Date: Mon, 17 May 2004 13:02:01 +0200
Cc: security@kde.org, kde-packager@kde.org, vendor-sec@lst.de
Subject: [kde-announce] KDE Security Advisory: URI Handler Vulnerabilities
X-CRM114-Status: Good ( pR: 0.0000 )
KDE Security Advisory: URI Handler Vulnerabilities
Original Release Date: 2004-05-17
URL: http://www.kde.org/info/security/advisory-20040517-1.txt
0. References
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=3D104
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCAN-2004-0411
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/363225
1. Systems affected:
All versions of KDE up to KDE 3.2.2 inclusive.=20
2. Overview:
iDEFENSE identified a vulnerability in the Opera Web Browser
that could allow remote attackers to create or truncate
arbitrary files. The KDE team has found that similar
vulnerabilities exists in KDE.
The telnet, rlogin, ssh and mailto URI handlers in KDE do not
check for '-' at the beginning of the hostname passed, which
makes it possible to pass an option to the programs started
by the handlers.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org)
has assigned the name CAN-2004-0411 to this issue.
3. Impact:
A remote attacker could entice a user to open a carefully crafted
telnet URI which may either create or truncate a file anywhere=20
where the victim has permission to do so. In KDE 3.2 and later
versions the user is first explicitly asked to confirm the opening
of the telnet URI.
A remote attacker could entice a user to open a carefully crafted
mailto URI which may start the KMail program with its display=20
redirected to a remote machine under control of the attacker.
An attacker can then use this to gain full access to the victims
personal files and account.
An attacker could entice a user to open a carefully crafted
mailto URI which may start the KMail program using a configuration
file specified by the attacker. If the attacker is able to install
arbitrary files somewhere on the machine, the attacker can include
commands in the configuration file which will be executed with the
privileges of the victim allowing the attacker to gain full access
to the victims personal files and account.
4. Solution:
Source code patches have been made available which fix these
vulnerabilities. Contact your OS vendor / binary package provider
for information about how to obtain updated binary packages.
5. Patch:
Patches for KDE 3.0.5b are available from
ftp://ftp.kde.org/pub/kde/security_patches :=20
5c573853ec3f426d33c559958baa2169 post-3.0.5b-kdelibs-kapplication.patch
eaf9237b3af56b3b01df966b13fe2714 post-3.0.5b-kdelibs-ktelnetservice.patch
Patches for KDE 3.1.5 are available from
ftp://ftp.kde.org/pub/kde/security_patches :=20
7c2bda942c4183d4163eb3f47f22e0bc post-3.1.5-kdelibs-kapplication.patch
bde52aa0bba055c4f678540ec20bfe5a post-3.1.5-kdelibs-ktelnetservice.patch
Patches for KDE 3.2.2 are available from
ftp://ftp.kde.org/pub/kde/security_patches :=20
7cebc1abb3141287db618486fd679b32 post-3.2.2-kdelibs-kapplication.patch
52e0e955204a77781505d33b9a3c341d post-3.2.2-kdelibs-ktelnetservice.patch
6. Time line and credits:
02/04/2003 Exploit acquired by iDEFENSE
12/05/2004 Public disclosure of Opera vulnerability
13/05/2004 KDE Team informed by Martin Ostertag
13/05/2004 Patches created
14/05/2004 Vendors notified
14/05/2004 Patches created for mailto problem.
17/05/2004 Public advisory
_______________________________________________
kde-announce mailing list
kde-announce@kde.org
https://mail.kde.org/mailman/listinfo/kde-announce
----- End forwarded message -----
--=20
Henry House
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