[vox-tech] Linux file/module security proposal.

[Wes Hardaker]

>>>>> On Fri, 22 Aug 2008 09:37:44 -0700, Bill Broadley <bill at cse.ucdavis.edu> said:

BB> I meant via root.  Does it work on your system by default?

Err...  Not actually sure.  I don't run SELinux by default since I have
a heavy development machine and it doesn't work perfectly (I'm a prime
example of someone who needs a better method for policy tweaking).

I suspect that there is a device I could write to that would let me
trump something in memory not assigned to the current process.  But I'm
not a heavy kernel hacker ;-)

BB> The signed modules has an implementation, and doesn't require the
BB> reboots.

I think I've come off too negative, btw.  I actually *do* want you to
succeed.  I was trying to point out all the things that need to be
thought about :-)  I do think they're all work-around-able.  They just
all need to be done.

One more thought: are you going to allow people to generate private keys
for loading privately compiled modules (preferably offline or on a
different system)?  IE, do you have any kernel modules loaded that
aren't distributed from your distro vendor?  Things like self-compiled
vmware, nvidia, etc drivers need to be signed...  If you only have a
distro key you've locked yourself out too (which is both good and bad).
-- 
"In the bathtub of history the truth is harder to hold than the soap,
 and much more difficult to find."  -- Terry Pratchett